

List of Submissions to ED 194 *Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor*

- 1 HoTARAC
- 2 Australasian Council of Auditors-General
- 3 PricewaterhouseCoopers
- 4 Representatives of the Australian Accounting Profession
(CPA Australia, The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and National
Institute of Accountants)

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Dear Mr ~~Stevenson~~

Kevin

EXPOSURE DRAFT 194 SERVICE CONCESSION ARRANGEMENTS: GRANTOR

The Heads of Treasuries Accounting and Reporting Advisory Committee welcomes the opportunity to provide comments to the Australian Accounting Standards Board on Exposure Draft 194 *Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor*.

Service concession arrangements have existed in Australia for the past 20 years and their use is increasing. There is a growing need for authoritative accounting guidance for service concession grantors. HoTARAC therefore supports the ED's objective which aims to meet this need.

HoTARAC agrees with the ED's proposals that:

- where a grantor controls service concession property it should recognise that property as its asset;
- the meaning of the word "regulates" in IFRIC 12 needs to be interpreted more narrowly when applied in a public sector context; and
- a grantor's revenues arising from a service concession arrangement may need to be recognised on an annuity, rather than a straight line, basis due to the extended duration of the arrangement.

HoTARAC appreciates the difficulty in trying to address the accounting for the various forms of service concession arrangement that exist. However, HoTARAC has concerns with the proposed approach to grantor accounting as the proposal:

- relies on rules rather than an underlying principle to determine which party controls the concession property;
- is based on the IFRIC 12 model, which HoTARAC considers to be problematic;
- does not exactly mirror IFRIC 12 despite purporting to do so, which could result in non-recognition of the service concession property by both parties;

- does not adequately explain or justify the basis for recognising a grantor's performance obligation and does not require such obligations to be recognised in all cases where they arise; and
- does not deal with service concession arrangements that fail the proposed grantor control criteria.

HoTARAC observes that some existing service concession arrangements would fall outside the scope of the ED because, despite it having a residual interest in the service concession property, the grantor does not control or regulate the operator's pricing or to whom the operator must provide services. According to the criteria in the ED, the grantor would not control or regulate the service concession property during the concession period.

The proposal will effectively scope out service concession arrangements where the property is not grantor controlled during the concession period. This will leave a number of existing arrangements without authoritative accounting guidance. It is also likely to introduce divergent accounting for economically similar arrangements which does not seem to be a sensible outcome.

HoTARAC is aware of three service concession arrangements where the grantor refrained from stepping in when the operators ran into financial difficulty and had to sell their interests in the arrangements. The grantor's lack of exposure and obligation in such circumstances suggests an absence of grantor control. However, under the proposals in the ED, two of these arrangements would meet the criteria for grantor-recognition, while the other arrangement would not. This also seems to be a questionable outcome.

HoTARAC encourages the Board to continue its deliberations on this important topic and urges the Board to consider the issues provided in Attachment 1.

If you have any queries regarding HoTARAC's comments, please contact Robert Williams from New South Wales Treasury on (02) 9228 3019.

Yours sincerely



D W Challen

CHAIR

HEADS OF TREASURIES ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING ADVISORY COMMITTEE

21 May 2010

Encl

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**DETAILED COMMENTS ON EXPOSURE DRAFT 194
SERVICE CONCESSION ARRANGEMENTS: GRANTOR**

An Approach Mirroring IFRIC 12 is Problematic

The Exposure Draft proposes to adopt an accounting approach for grantors which mirrors that adopted for operators under IFRIC Interpretation 12 *Service Concession Arrangements* issued by the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee.

HoTARAC considers the proposed approach, based on IFRIC 12, to be problematic as:

- both IFRIC 12 and the ED are narrow in scope, only addressing arrangements involving property that is grantor-controlled (in accordance with the criteria in IFRIC 12 and the ED);
- the ED does not articulate a clear conceptual basis for its proposals and the consequent accounting treatments;
- both IFRIC 12 and the ED are inconsistent with existing authoritative guidance on control of an asset;
- they adopt a rule-based approach;
- the control criteria is not neutral and it presupposes grantor control of service concession property; and
- neither IFRIC 12 nor the ED define Service Concession Arrangements or Control of an Asset which are arguably their core terms.

In addition, the ED does not exactly mirror IFRIC 12 despite claiming to do so.

The approach proposed by the ED is based on an unsatisfactory model. The control criteria purports to be grantor-based, however, is developed from the operator's viewpoint, without considering the grantor's perspective.

These matters are discussed below.

Too Narrow in Scope

HoTARAC considers that, despite its title and objective, the proposals only deal with service concession arrangements where property is grantor-controlled during and after the concession period. The service concession property could include:

- (a) grantor-controlled during and after the concession period;
- (b) operator-controlled during the concession period and grantor-controlled thereafter;
- (c) grantor-controlled during the concession period and operator-controlled thereafter; or
- (d) operator-controlled during and after the concession period.

It is disappointing that the ED only considers one of these cases. This is unhelpful to grantors involved in other forms of service concession arrangement. For example, HoTARAC is aware of several service concession arrangements in category (b).

HoTARAC suggests that, if the Standard resulting from the ED only deals with service concession arrangements where the property is grantor-controlled, its title and objective should be modified to make this limitation clear.

Not concept-based

The ED outlines criteria for determining whether a grantor controls, and should therefore recognise, a service concession asset (Paragraphs 10 and 11). The recognition criteria embodies the notion of control and is based on criteria set out in IFRIC 12.

HoTARAC agrees that control is a significant factor in determining the existence of an asset. The notion of control is embodied in the definition of asset (or assets) in IPSAS 1 and in the IASB and AASB *Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements*.

HoTARAC notes that authoritative accounting guidance provides various ways of determining control of an asset:

- IPSAS 23 *Revenue from Non-Exchange Transactions (Taxes and Transfers)* contains a definition for control of an asset. Similar guidance is given in IAS 38 *Intangible Assets*;
- IPSAS 13, IAS 17 and AASB 117 *Leases* adopt a risks and rewards approach to determine whether an entity should recognise an asset; and
- IFRIC 12 sets out criteria to determine whether a grantor controls the service concession infrastructure.

A rights and obligations approach might also be adopted if two parties control different aspects of the same asset.

The ED adopts the IFRIC 12 model without giving any conceptual reasons for choosing it. The model seems to have been adopted for consistency of grantor and operator accounting. Grantors and operators would both use the approach when determining whether the service concession property should be accounted for as an asset (Paragraphs BC 2 and BC 14). Although consistency is desirable, the ED would need to demonstrate that the proposed model is conceptually justifiable and superior to alternative models.

HoTARAC notes that IFRIC 12 introduced a new model for determining control that is not based on the models used by existing Accounting Standards or the IASB's Conceptual Framework. Therefore, HoTARAC has reservations about using the IFRIC 12 model as the basis for grantor accounting. HoTARAC also notes the widespread criticism of the IFRIC 12 model by respondents during its exposure period.

HoTARAC notes that the US Governmental Accounting Standards Board is presently deliberating on its own project on Accounting for Service Concession Arrangements. The Board, although adopting tests similar to those in IFRIC 12, has decided that the concession arrangements should be articulated as scoping criteria, rather than control criteria. This suggests that there is some doubt about whether the IFRIC 12 tests are a valid model for determining control.

The ED's Basis for Conclusions dismisses the risks and rewards approach, in a cursory (single-paragraph) analysis. It asserts that:

- the primary purpose of a service concession arrangement is to provide service potential rather than economic benefits;
- a control approach focuses on service potential rather than economic benefits;
- the risks and rewards approach focuses only on economic factors; and
- therefore, the risks and rewards approach cannot be used to determine control (Paragraph BC 11).

HoTARAC disagrees with these assertions, and considers that both economic benefits and the risks and rewards approach are relevant when assessing which party controls service concession property. In addition, the concepts of control and risks and rewards are complementary not competitive. The ED has not adequately justified the reasons for rejecting a risks and rewards approach in favour of the proposed approach based on IFRIC 12.

The ED does not consider the merits of using the existing definition of control of an asset in IPSAS 23. Further, the ED's Basis for Conclusions considers and dismisses the rights and obligations approach.

HoTARAC is concerned that the ED has not offered a conceptual basis for adopting its preferred model. The ED does not articulate any underlying principle for determining control.

In light of its concerns with IFRIC 12, HoTARAC considers that there is merit in considering approaches based on other existing authoritative guidance.

HoTARAC also suggests that, given that the IPSASB is seeking greater alignment between accounting and statistical frameworks, there is merit in considering the statistical framework before concluding on this project. Chapter 22 of the *System of National Accounts 2008* refers to service concession arrangements, control and risks and rewards.

Inconsistent with existing Standards

The ED's Basis for Conclusions notes that the main accounting issue in service concession arrangements is whether the grantor should recognise a service concession asset and a related liability (Paragraph BC 10). HoTARAC agrees that determining which party controls, and should therefore recognise the service concession property, is the fundamental accounting question.

It is noted that, although the ED (like IFRIC 12) does not define it, control of an asset is defined or described elsewhere in Accounting Standards. IPSAS 23 Paragraph 7 states that "control of an asset arises when the entity can use or otherwise benefit from the asset in pursuit of its objectives and can exclude or otherwise regulate the access of others to that benefit".

IAS 38 and AASB 138 *Intangible Assets* also contain similar guidance.

This definition of control is based on the benefits from, and access to, an asset. However, the grantor control criteria employed in the ED is focussed on access rather than benefits. It is not clear whether this was intentional. Nevertheless, HoTARAC is concerned that the ED ignores the existing authoritative guidance on control without giving any reason. Using the IPSAS 23 definition may give different outcomes.

HoTARAC urges the Board to explain the reasons for departing from existing guidelines.

Rule-based

In accordance with Paragraph 10, the ED proposes several criteria for determining whether a grantor should recognise service concession property as its asset:

The grantor shall recognise a service concession asset ... if:

- (a) The grantor controls or regulates what services the operator must provide with the asset, to whom it must provide them, and at what price; and
- (b) The grantor controls ... any significant residual interest in the asset at the end of the term of the arrangement.

This Standard applies to an asset used in a service concession arrangement for its entire useful life (a whole-of-life asset) if the condition in Paragraph 10(a) is met (Paragraph 11).

A grantor would recognise a service concession asset if it controls: the services provided with; the customers served by; the prices charged for use of; and (if not a whole-of-life asset) the residual interest in the service concession property.

These control criteria operate as a set of rules to determine whether the grantor controls the service concession property. As mentioned above, the proposal does not articulate any underlying principle. HoTARAC has a number of concerns with the proposed criteria.

In the absence of a clearly articulated underlying principle, rules can take a form over substance approach. Rules can be circumvented by structuring arrangements to achieve particular accounting outcomes. Principles are less susceptible to circumvention in this way.

Without any underlying conceptual basis for the control criteria, it may be difficult to determine whether a particular arrangement is within the scope of the ED. Could an arrangement be considered to be substantively within the scope of the ED even if it does not strictly satisfy all of the criteria? Would the mere inclusion of a recital clause in the preamble to a contract (mentioning that services are to be provided to the public) be sufficient as evidence that the grantor controls or regulates to whom the services are provided?

Further, the proposed rules may be difficult to apply in practice. It is unclear how strictly these rules should be applied. Where market forces rather than contractual specifications determine the extent of the service concession property's use, at least some of the grantor control criteria appear to be irrelevant. In HoTARAC's experience, some service concession arrangements do not specify which party controls or regulates the pricing of services. Such arrangements would arguably fail to meet the grantor control criteria and would be outside the scope of the ED.

While HoTARAC acknowledges that the ED's Basis for Conclusions (Paragraph BC 14) states that asset recognition is to be determined on all the facts and circumstances of the arrangement, the ED itself relies on rules for determining grantor control. It is difficult to take account of other facts and circumstances if an arrangement does not satisfy all of the prescribed rules.

Not neutral

Paragraph 10 of the ED proposes several control criteria to determine whether a grantor has a service concession asset.

HoTARAC is concerned that the criteria has a grantor focus rather than a property focus. To assess control on the basis of whether the grantor meets the criteria appears to assume grantor control. The proposed criteria can never demonstrate operator control. The criteria can only indicate the presence or absence of grantor control.

HoTARAC also considers it inappropriate that the ED's proposed approach is based on IFRIC 12, which specifies operator accounting based, not on whether the operator itself controls the service concession property, but on whether the grantor (not subject to IFRIC 12) controls it. Given that IFRIC 12 does not consider the grantor's perspective, it seems inappropriate to use it as a basis for specifying grantor accounting.

HoTARAC suggests that a more neutral and straightforward approach should be used. The control criteria should determine which party controls the service concession property rather than focusing on whether a particular party has such control.

Core terms are not defined

The ED does not define Service Concession Arrangement or Control of an Asset, which are identified as the ED's core terms. While acknowledging that the ED describes the nature of a service concession agreement in Paragraphs 2 and 7, HoTARAC considers that it would be helpful if the core terms were explicitly defined.

A service concession arrangement might be defined as a binding arrangement under which a public sector entity (the grantor) conveys to another, usually for-profit sector, entity (the operator) the right to use a service concession asset to provide services directly to the public on behalf of the grantor.

As noted above, IPSAS 23 contains a definition for control of an asset, which may at least provide a useful starting point for determining control of a service concession asset.

Asymmetrical

The ED's proposals are intended to mirror the IFRIC 12 approach (Paragraphs IN2 and AG3 and Specific Matter for Comment). However, in at least two instances, the ED does not exactly mirror IFRIC 12 despite claiming to do so. Consequently, some service concession property might be recognised by neither party to the arrangement.

The first instance of asymmetry with IFRIC 12 relates to the meaning of the word “regulates”. Both the ED and IFRIC 12 indicate that grantor-control of a service concession asset would occur where the grantor controls or regulates what services the operator must provide with the asset, to whom it must provide them, and at what price (ED 48 Paragraph 10).

In the ED, “the term ‘regulate’ is not intended to convey the broad sense of ... sovereign or legislative powers ... Rather, it is intended to be applied in the context of the specific terms of the service concession arrangement” (Paragraph AG8).

This contrasts with IFRIC 12 that regulation “could be by contract or otherwise (such as through a regulator). ... the grantor and any related parties shall be considered together. ... the public sector as a whole, together with any regulators acting in the public interest, shall be regarded as related to the grantor ...” (IFRIC 12, Paragraph AG2)

The meaning of the term “regulates” is narrower in the ED than it is in IFRIC 12. HoTARAC considers that IFRIC 12 is too broad and needs to be narrowed. The power of government to establish the regulatory environment within which entities operate and to impose conditions or sanctions on their operations does not itself constitute control of the assets deployed by those entities (AASB 127, Paragraph Aus17.9(d) and IPSAS 6, Paragraph 37(a)).

However, this creates an inconsistency. The ED does not consistently mirror IFRIC 12. This inconsistency could result in neither party recognising the service concession property.

For example, an operator applying IFRIC 12 may conclude that service concession property is grantor-controlled by virtue of the grantor’s regulatory power arising from legislation, or through an independent price regulator established by legislation. However, a grantor applying the ED’s proposals may conclude that the same service concession property is not grantor-controlled because the grantor has no regulatory power under the specific terms of the service concession agreement. Thus, the property would not be recognised by each party.

HoTARAC considers that this outcome primarily arises from the failure of IFRIC 12 to consider the public sector grantor’s perspective.

The second instance of asymmetry relates to capital work-in-progress. The ED discusses the timing of recognition of a service concession asset constructed by the operator. Paragraph AG20 also notes that where the operator bears the construction risk, the grantor will normally recognise the asset (and by implication the related liability) when the asset is placed into use.

HoTARAC considers this to be problematic as the treatment proposed in the ED does not mirror that in IFRIC 12. Under IFRIC 12, the operator recognises an accruing receivable as the service concession asset is constructed. Under ED 43, the grantor’s corresponding payable would not be recognised until the asset is used. A further consequence is that neither of the parties would recognise the capital work-in-progress during the construction period.

Concluding remarks on the approach mirroring IFRIC 12

HoTARAC considers that the disadvantages of adopting an approach based on IFRIC 12 greatly outweigh any perceived advantages.

HoTARAC considers that there is merit in revisiting approaches based on other existing authoritative guidance. Available models for determining which party controls service concession property include the control of an asset definition in IPSAS 23, or a risks and rewards approach as used in IPSAS 13. In addition, a rights and obligations approach, apportioning the asset between the two parties merits further consideration. The IASB's thinking appears to be heading in this direction. Its recent Discussion Paper on Revenue Recognition contemplates measuring the rights and obligations in contracts with customers.

Paragraph 10 of the ED could be modified to simply require a grantor to recognise a service concession asset that it controls, with the remainder of that paragraph being provided as application guidance. This may avoid having a new set of black-letter control criteria.

Performance obligations exist independently of payment obligations

The ED proposes that when a grantor recognises a service concession asset it should also recognise a corresponding liability for its payment obligation and/or performance obligation to the operator (Paragraphs 19, 21 and 22). The liability is initially measured at the fair value of the asset (Paragraphs 15 and 20). The payment obligation represents amounts payable to the operator for the asset. The performance obligation represents the right granted to the operator to earn revenue from the service concession asset or from another revenue-generating asset (Paragraphs 22 and AG41).

Because the payment and/or performance obligations must initially equate to the value of the asset, it appears that the performance obligation is the difference between the value of the service concession asset and the value of any payment obligation. In effect, the ED proposes that a performance obligation is recognised only to the extent that the payment obligation falls short of the fair value of the service concession asset.

HoTARAC considers that the proposed recognition of a grantor's performance obligation is unclear and irregular.

Under most, if not all service concession arrangements, the grantor would have a performance obligation to the operator to continue to provide the granted concession rights during the concession period. If such an obligation is to be recognised, it would not make sense to only recognise it to the extent that the grantor does not have a payment obligation.

Consider two service concession arrangements where the operator constructs a service concession asset and operates it on behalf of the grantor, in exchange for the right to collect user charges. In Arrangement A, the operator recovers construction and operating costs solely from user charges. In Arrangement B, the operator recovers operating costs from user charges and construction costs from the grantor via a series of predetermined payments. The grantor would have an identical performance obligation under each arrangement, regardless of it having an additional payment obligation under Arrangement B. However, the ED would only recognise a performance obligation in Arrangement A. The liability under Arrangement B would be a payment obligation.

HoTARAC considers that, if the performance obligation exists, it should be treated similarly in all cases, regardless of whether the grantor has a payment obligation. The performance obligation should be recognised in full or not at all, not just sometimes.

Further, the proposal could benefit from a more comprehensive explanation of the nature of a grantor's performance obligation and how it relates to revenue recognition.

A grantor's performance obligation is not a provision

The ED requires the grantor to account for a performance obligation, where it is recognised, in accordance with Paragraph 22 IPSAS 19 *Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets*. The ED notes that, "when the operator is compensated by being granted a right to earn revenues from either the service concession asset or another asset provided by the grantor, the [grantor's] liability is a performance obligation because the grantor is obligated to provide the asset to the [operator]. IPSAS 19 provides guidance for such circumstances" (Paragraph AG29).

HoTARAC finds this requirement and guidance to be problematic for the following reasons:

- it is unclear whether the performance obligation relates to the right to earn revenues (a licence) or the service concession asset or other asset provided by the grantor for the operator to use (a physical asset), or both;
- IPSAS 19 does not provide any specific guidance on performance obligations;
- IPSAS 19 Paragraph 18 defines liabilities as "present obligations of the entity resulting from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying future economic benefits or service potential". Given this, it is questionable whether the grantor in the contemplated arrangement would have any continuing liability as both the licence and the physical asset given to the operator at the start of the concession period would settle any present obligation of the grantor. Further, once the licence has been granted or the physical asset transferred to the operator, no further economic benefits or service potential would be required to flow from the grantor; and
- IPSAS 19 defines a provision as "a liability of uncertain timing or amount". In the contemplated arrangement, the ED would require the performance obligation to be initially measured at fair value (Paragraph AG41) and reduced as access to the asset is provided over the term of the arrangement (Paragraphs AG38, AG40). As the timing and amount of the performance obligation are determinable there does not appear to be any requirement for a provision.

HoTARAC suggests that Paragraphs 22 and AG29 be reconsidered and the basis for recognising a performance obligation be explained and justified. The US GASB has tentatively decided that a grantor (which it calls a transferor) should recognise a deferred inflow rather than a performance obligation (outflow) in the circumstances described above.

HoTARAC is also aware that the IASB is considering the nature and measurement of performance obligations as part of its Projects on Leases and Revenue Recognition. It may be prudent for IPSASB to await the outcome of those Projects before issuing a Standard in this area.

Some arrangements are not contemplated

The Implementation Guidance accompanying the ED provides a Table of references to Standards that apply to typical types of arrangements involving an asset combined with the provision of a service (Implementation Guidance and Paragraph BC3). However, the Table does not relate the arrangements classification to the presence or absence of the grantor-control criteria in the ED. Nor does it deal with some common forms of service concession arrangement.

The Table does not deal with Build-Operate-Transfer arrangements that do not meet the grantor-control criteria in the ED. While the table suggests that BOT arrangements would normally be within the scope of the ED, the absence of grantor-control would place them outside the scope. What Standard would apply in this case?

Also, the Table does not deal with operator-owned property that transfers to the grantor at the end of the concession period. While the Table suggests that arrangements involving operator-owned infrastructure would be outside the scope of the ED, it does not contemplate Build-Own-Operate-Transfer arrangements, where operator-owned property ultimately transfers to the grantor. These arrangements are common in Australia. Are BOOT arrangements also meant to be outside scope because the operator owns the underlying property? Would it make a difference if the property was constructed on land leased from the grantor?

Guidance on accounting for these forms of service concession arrangement would be helpful.

What if the grantor does not control the service concession property?

The ED notes that, in exchange for obtaining a service concession asset, a grantor may give an operator one or more of the following:

- a right to use the service concession asset (Paragraphs 23, AG38, AG42, AG43, BC17);
- a predetermined series of payments (Paragraphs 21, AG31);
- a right to earn revenues (Paragraphs 22, AG29, AG38, AG41, AG44, BC17); and
- access to another revenue-generating asset (Paragraphs 22, AG40, AG44, BC17).

HoTARAC agrees that a service concession arrangement is an exchange transaction, and that these are the typical types of consideration given by a grantor. Further, HoTARAC considers the fundamental consideration is the right to use the service concession property. This is the essence of a service concession. The other types of consideration, though often found, are not essential. Moreover, all of these types of consideration can occur regardless of which party controls the service concession property.

The ED's approach is premised on the grantor's liability arising in exchange for receiving the service concession asset at the start of the concession period, and the grantor gaining control of the asset at that time. The grantor receives a service concession asset as consideration for, and in advance of, providing access or another asset to the operator (Paragraph BC17).

However, HoTARAC has found that service concession arrangements can also take other forms and give rise to accounting issues not addressed in the ED. For example, in a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer arrangement, a grantor might only control the service concession property from the end rather than the start of the concession period. If the grantor does not control the service concession property during the concession period, the nature of the initial transaction might be an exchange of one right (service concession) for another (right to receive control of the service concession asset at the end of the service concession). An example of this is the exchange of rights with deferred settlement by one party.

HoTARAC has identified several examples of service concession arrangements in which the grantor does not control or regulate the pricing of services and/or to whom the operator must provide them. In such cases, the grantor controls a residual interest at the end of the concession period but, applying the ED's proposed grantor control criteria, does not control the use of the property during the concession period. Such arrangements would be outside the scope of the ED.

HoTARAC considers that the Standard arising from the ED should give specific guidance on how a grantor should account for arrangements where the grantor only has a residual interest in the service concession property. The Consultation Paper that preceded the ED proposed different accounting treatments, which depended on whether the grantor had full control, part control or no control during or after the concession period. The absence of such guidance in the ED is not helpful.

HoTARAC considers that arrangements giving rights to use service concession property or to earn revenue from such property are in the nature of licensing agreements. The grantor effectively licenses the operator to operate the service concession property to provide public services, or collect revenue from the public, or both. IFRIC 12 also acknowledges that a right to charge users is a licence (IFRIC 12, Paragraph 17). However, HoTARAC notes that the Standards on Leases (IPSAS 13, IAS 17 and AASB 117) all scope out licensing arrangements.

When determining how a grantor should account for the giving of the service concession in exchange for receiving a right to receive the service concession property at the end of the concession period, the Emerging Asset approach should be considered.

Under this approach, the grantor recognises both an asset and revenue that accrues over the concession period. This approach also reflects revenue arising from the granting of the concession on a systematic basis over the concession period and also the accruing right to receive the property over the same period. This approach is used in Application Note F *Private Finance Initiative and Similar Contracts* which forms part of the United Kingdom Accounting Standards Board's Financial Reporting Standard 5 *Reporting the Substance of Transactions*. The Emerging Asset approach has been used in Australia to account for the emerging value of the right. HoTARAC considers that this approach has merit and has previously endorsed it for use by Australian grantors.

It would be helpful if the Standard resulting from the ED addressed the accounting for service concession arrangements where the grantor's control of the underlying property is deferred until the end of the concession period.

Consistency and comparability are not achieved

The IPSASB believes that the ED will promote consistency and comparability in the reporting of service concession arrangements by public sector entities (Paragraph BC1).

HoTARAC observes that, in some cases, the ED may result in diverse accounting for substantively similar arrangements. For example, one Australian grantor has 14 service concession arrangements where a service concession is given in exchange for each operator building and operating the service concession property and transferring it to the grantor at the end of the concession period. All of the operators finance the arrangements solely from user charges collected from the public.

All of these arrangements are substantively similar and are presently accounted for consistently, as emerging assets. However, because of the specific terms of the contracts, just over one-third of them will fail the grantor control criteria. Those within the scope of the ED will be recognised as the grantor's physical asset at the start of the concession period. Arrangements not controlled by the grantor during the concession period in terms of the ED will be recognised as the grantor's physical asset only at the conclusion of the concession period. The grantor's interest in the latter group will be residual. In these arrangements, the accounting treatment will depend on whether the contract specifies the pricing; or that the services are to be provided to the public. If it does so specify, the grantor can demonstrate its ability to control or regulate the pricing and to whom the services are provided. Where the operator has an unrestricted choice as to pricing and to whom the services are provided, and the grantor has no contractual right to intervene, the property is not recognisable as a service concession asset under the ED.

Consider two service concession arrangements that only differ in their pricing terms. One specifies a cap on the prices the operator can charge the public for the services. The other does not specify any pricing restrictions but instead implicitly relies on market forces to keep the prices at a reasonable level. Under the ED, the grantor would control or regulate the prices in the first case but not the second. Therefore, the second arrangement would not be within the scope of the ED.

Also consider two service concession arrangements that only differ in their specification of the intended customers. One contemplates that the operator is to provide services to the public. The other does not specify any customers but instead implicitly relies on market forces to encourage the operator to provide services to any interested member of the public who is prepared to pay for the service. Under the ED, the grantor would probably be held to control or regulate to whom the services are provided in the first case but not in the second. Therefore, the second arrangement would not be within the scope of the ED.

HoTARAC considers it unfortunate that the ED is likely, in some cases, to introduce inconsistent accounting for substantively similar service concession arrangements and that it will not provide accounting guidance for the arrangements that fail its grantor control criteria. HoTARAC also considers it undesirable that different accounting outcomes could arise from the inclusion of an otherwise inconsequential phrase in a service concession arrangement.

Work-in-progress is not recognised

Paragraph AG20 of the ED discusses the timing of recognition of a service concession asset constructed by the operator. It notes that, where the operator bears the construction risk, the grantor will normally recognise the asset (and by implication the related liability) when the asset is placed into use. HoTARAC considers this to be problematical for the following reasons:

- Under accrual accounting principles, the grantor should recognise the asset and liability progressively as it is constructed rather than when it is complete, regardless of which party bears construction risk. A service concession asset is, by definition, grantor controlled and it is being constructed for the grantor pursuant to the contractual requirements of the service concession arrangement.
- As mentioned earlier, the treatment proposed in the ED does not mirror that in IFRIC 12. Under IFRIC 12, the operator recognises a cumulative receivable as the service concession asset is constructed. Under the ED's proposals, the grantor would not recognise the corresponding payable until the asset is placed into use. A further consequence is that neither of the parties would recognise the capital work-in-progress during the construction period.
- The deferred recognition of the liability could inappropriately encourage these types of transactions and provide financial engineering opportunities resulting in governments reporting lower levels of debt compared with more direct financing transactions that have similar economic or present-value impact. The financial implications could be significant given that these are typically high value contracts involving construction over several years.

HoTARAC suggests that, if a grantor is to recognise a service concession asset, the grantor should also recognise the associated work-in-progress and the related liability as they accrue.

Nature of grantor's residual interest

The ED notes that for the purpose of Paragraph 10(b), "the grantor's control over any significant residual interest should both restrict the operator's practical ability to sell or pledge the asset and give the grantor a continuing right of use throughout the period of the arrangement" (Paragraph AG9).

In other words, a grantor will not control a significant residual interest unless it also has a continuing right of use throughout the concession period.

HoTARAC considers that a fundamental feature of service concession arrangements is that they require the operator to use the service concession property to provide services to the public. It is hard to see how a grantor has a continuing right of use throughout the concession period if the operator has use of the property under a binding arrangement with the grantor. Instead of a right of use, the grantor may have a right to receive the service concession property at the end of the concession period.

HoTARAC suggests that this be explained in the resulting Standard.

Scope clarifications

HoTARAC generally supports the scope of the term "service concession arrangement" as described in the ED (Paragraphs 2, 7 and AG1).

However, HoTARAC observes that service concession arrangements do not always set the initial prices to be levied by the operator or mechanisms for adjusting such prices. There are several examples of Australian service concession arrangements which do not deal with pricing or whether the operator may set and vary the fees it charges its customers. Some arrangements go further and exempt the operator from regulation by the government's independent pricing regulator. HoTARAC considers these to be service concession arrangements even though their features may be atypical.

Further, HoTARAC suggests that for clarity, arrangements where the grantor is the primary operator should be explicitly scoped out of the description in Paragraph 7.

Under some public-private partnerships in Australia, the public sector party controls the property (for example a hospital or school) as purchaser or lessee and is the primary provider of services using the property. The for-profit sector designs, finances and constructs the property and provides ancillary services (such as property maintenance), for an extended period. HoTARAC considers that such arrangements would be outside the scope of the ED because the public sector is the primary operator of the asset. However, it could be also argued that the for-profit sector is providing some level of indirect service to the public on behalf of the grantor by servicing the buildings, and that this aspect is a service concession arrangement.

HoTARAC suggests that the description of a service concession arrangement should explicitly exclude arrangements where the public sector party is the primary operator of the property, notwithstanding that the for-profit sector may provide some secondary services. The proposal might also specifically exclude arrangements where the public sector party purchases or leases the property. Such arrangements would be covered by existing standards on property, plant and equipment or leases.

Future economic benefits can be relevant

The ED's Basis for Conclusions, in discussing the rationale for adopting a control-based approach, notes that "the primary purpose of a service concession asset is to provide service potential on behalf of the public sector entity, and not to provide economic benefits such as revenue generated by these assets from user fees" (Paragraph BC11).

While HoTARAC acknowledges the importance of the concept of control in relation to asset recognition, it does not necessarily agree that service potential, rather than economic benefit, is the primary reason for undertaking service concession arrangements. Most service concession arrangements would not proceed without the assurance of a flow of future economic benefits. This is typically how service concession property is funded.

A control model based solely on a consideration of service potential without having regard to economic benefits may produce inappropriate outcomes. In many service concession arrangements, the operator has economic control, is exposed to most of the economic risks, and enjoys the majority of the economic benefits. There are several Australian cases of the grantor refraining from stepping in when the operator ran into financial difficulty and had to sell its interests in the arrangement. Arguably, these examples suggest operator control and the operator's exposure to the risks and rewards inherent in the service concession property.

Further, HoTARAC considers that both future economic benefits and service potential are relevant. The definition of assets encompasses both. HoTARAC therefore recommends that the conceptual rationale for preferring service potential over economic benefits be reconsidered.

No guidance for Government Business Enterprises

The proposals in the ED would not apply to Government Business Enterprises (Paragraph 5). The ED's Basis for Conclusions notes that the operator may be a GBE, that IPSASs are not designed to apply to GBEs and that International Financial Reporting Standards apply to GBEs (Paragraph BC 6).

However, there is no international guidance for a service concession grantor that is a GBE. Such entities are scoped out of IFRIC 12, which only applies to operators, and scoped out of the ED which would only apply to public sector entities that are not GBEs.

HoTARAC acknowledges that IPSASs are not normally intended to apply to GBEs. However, HoTARAC encourages the Board to consider making an exception in this case and extend the Standard resulting from the ED to GBEs that are service concession grantors.

Interrelationship with Interpretation 4

The ED does not address the potential interrelationship with IFRIC (and AASB) Interpretation 4 *Determining Whether an Arrangement Contains a Lease* (IFRIC 4). This could give rise to uncertainty in countries (such as Australia) that adopt IFRIC or equivalent Interpretations.

Although IFRIC 4 requires certain arrangements to be accounted for as leases, service concession arrangements within the scope of IFRIC 12 are specifically excluded. However, because the scope of IFRIC differs slightly from that of the ED, arrangements covered by the latter will not necessarily be excluded from IFRIC 4.

From a grantor's perspective, a service concession arrangement within the scope of IFRIC 12 is scoped out of IFRIC 4, regardless of the fact that IFRIC 12 only applies to an operator, under such an arrangement.

HoTARAC considers that, because the grantor control criteria in IFRIC 12 are broader than those in the ED, a service concession arrangement within the scope of the ED would be likely to be within the scope of IFRIC 12 and would therefore be excluded from the scope of IFRIC 4. See comments above, under *Asymmetry*.

However, HoTARAC notes that the ED does not alter the IFRIC 4 scope exclusion (based on IFRIC 12). It is not the IPSASB's prerogative to amend IFRIC Interpretations. Therefore, grantors would still have to apply the slightly different grantor control criteria in IFRIC 12 to ascertain whether or not to apply IFRIC 4, despite IFRIC 12 being otherwise irrelevant to grantors. This is likely to be confusing and inconvenient for grantors.

HoTARAC therefore recommends that the interaction between IFRIC 4, IFRIC 12 and the ED be reviewed by the AASB and that consideration be given to replacing the present IFRIC 4 scope exclusion, based solely on IFRIC 12, to one which is based, in the case of grantors, on the standard resulting from the ED. The AASB might apply its agreed process for not-for-profit modifications and consider whether the use of an Aus paragraph could address any shortcomings.

Minor corrections and clarifications

HoTARAC notes the following matters in the ED that need to be corrected or clarified:

- In Paragraphs 8(c) and AG18, it seems illogical to treat parts of an upgraded asset differently; only recognising the upgraded portion as a service concession asset.
- The requirement in Paragraph 12 to reclassify but not recognise certain existing grantor assets as service concession assets seems to be internally inconsistent and needs to be clarified. This may also affect Paragraphs 8(d), 12 and the Implementation Guidance on page 31.
- It is unclear whether an asset reclassified under Paragraph 12 would also give rise to a corresponding liability under Paragraph 19.
- It would be helpful to have an example of when a service concession asset might be intangible, as contemplated by Paragraph 13.
- In Paragraphs 14(b) and AG22(b), the expression "Compensating the grantor ..." should be "Compensating the operator...".
- In Paragraph 30, the intention of the word "prospectively" is unclear. Does it mean the standard would apply to (a) new arrangements commencing after the effective date or (b) existing arrangements but only from that financial year onwards?

- Paragraph AG12 is ambiguous. The conditions in Paragraph 10(a) could never be met if the asset (being a separate cash generating unit) is used wholly for unregulated purposes.
- In Paragraph AG29, the word grantor (where last used) should be operator.
- Given the adjacent guidance about the operator's cost of capital (Paragraph 34) and the grantor's incremental borrowing rate (Paragraph AG36), the first sentence of Paragraph AG35 might clarify whether it is referring to the grantor or the operator.
- Revenue recognition requirements are inconsistent. Paragraph AG38 requires a grantor to recognise revenue as the performance obligation liability is reduced but Paragraph AG39 prohibits a grantor from recognising revenue. Perhaps Paragraph AG39 should state that "The grantor does not recognise revenue that the operator collects, unless ..."
- Paragraph AG52 might be clarified to read: "The grantor's finance charge ..."
- The proposed consequential amendments to Paragraph 27 of IPSAS 13 *Leases* incorrectly refer to a "service concession arrangement as defined in IPSAS XX (ED 43)" (Appendix B, emphasis added). However, ED 43 does not actually define service concession arrangement. The word "defined" should be replaced with "described".
- In the illustrative examples, it would be helpful to have an example that includes a revenue-sharing arrangement.



AUSTRALASIAN
COUNCIL OF
AUDITORS-GENERAL

24 May 2010

Mr. Kevin Stevenson
Chairman
Australian Accounting Standards Board
P O Box 204
Collins Street West
MELBOURNE VIC 8007

Dear Mr Stevenson

IPSASB ED 43 / AASB ED 194 – Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor

Attached for your information is a copy of the Australasian Council of Auditors-General (ACAG) response to the Exposure Draft referred to above.

The views expressed in this submission represent those of all Australian members of ACAG.

In addition, ACAG provides the following comments which are specific to the proposed Australian Accounting Standards.

Consolidated Pronouncement

ACAG believes that it would be appropriate for the accounting treatment for a service concession arrangement for a grantor and operator to be stipulated in the same pronouncement.

Scope of the ED

As noted in the letter to the IPSASB, service concession arrangements in Australia currently operate for both for-profit and not-for-profit government bodies. As such, ACAG believes it would be appropriate for any service concession arrangement pronouncements to be applicable to both types of government entities.

Definitions

To assist in clarity, ACAG recommends that public sector be defined.

Drafting conventions

ACAG believes that application of the AASB's drafting conventions would aid in consistent interpretation of the requirements.

Concordance with AASB pronouncements

Adoption of the requirements proposed in ED 194 would require a detailed review of their fit with existing requirements. In particular, pronouncements related to leasing would need to be examined.

In addition, we note that ED 194 refers to application of IPSAS 19 'Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets' to determine the value of a performance obligation after initial recognition. The Australian counterpart to this standard, AASB 137, defines liabilities differently to IPSAS 19. Without the reference to 'service obligations' as found in the definition of a liability in IPSAS 19, the performance obligation would not be able to be recognised under AASB 137.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Simon O'Neill', with a horizontal line underneath.

Simon O'Neill
Chairman
ACAG Financial Reporting and Auditing Committee



24 May 2010

Ms Stephenie Fox
Technical Director
International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board
International Federation of Accountants
277 Wellington Street, 4th Floor
Toronto, Ontario M5V 3H2 CANADA

Dear Ms Fox

IPSASB ED 43 – Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor

Attached is the Australasian Council of Auditors-General (ACAG) response to the Exposure Draft referred to above.

ACAG members are pleased that the IPSASB is addressing, through this Exposure Draft, the accounting treatment for Service Concession Arrangements for Grantors.

The views expressed in this submission represent those of all Australian members of ACAG.

The opportunity to comment is appreciated and I trust you will find the attached comments useful.

Yours sincerely

Simon O'Neill
Chairman
ACAG Financial Reporting and Auditing Committee

cc: Mr Kevin Stevenson, Chairman, Australian Accounting Standards Board

IPSASB ED 43 – Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor

ACAG has reviewed the exposure draft *Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor* issued by the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) and provides the following comments.

Overall comment

ACAG members are pleased that the IPSASB is addressing, through this Exposure Draft, accounting treatment for Service Concession Arrangements for Grantors. We consider such information to be of significant public interest.

Accounting by the grantor and operator

ACAG considers that it would make for a more efficient process if both the grantor and operator accounting treatments were considered simultaneously.

Application of IFRIC 12 and the Exposure Draft could potentially see there being no asset recorded to reflect relevant property (real or otherwise) by either party or, potentially, assets being recorded by both the operator and grantor.

Scope of the Exposure Draft

ACAG encourages the IPSASB to adopt a more conceptual approach in identifying the types of arrangements to be captured by the Exposure Draft.

Many forms of service concession arrangements exist. The Exposure Draft captures a narrow form of these. In Australia, service concession arrangements can relate to both government business enterprises and non-government business enterprises. As such, ACAG would prefer any service concession arrangement standards to extend to cover all types of government entities.

In addition, the rules-based nature of the Exposure Draft poses a risk that the wording in contracts determines the applicability of the standard, rather than the substance of the agreement. For example, if a contractual arrangement were silent on pricing or customers, it may not meet the criteria of paragraph 10. Alternatively, an identical arrangement with a more explicit contract may be captured by the Exposure Draft.

Recording of a Service Concession Asset

The Exposure Draft requires recognition of a service concession asset depending on control criteria related to the service provision rather than being tied to the physical or intangible asset. This is not consistent with the control criteria discussed in IPSAS 23. ACAG considers that the concepts used in the Exposure Draft should fit with the concepts applied across the suite of standards.

ACAG considers that control is the most appropriate and objective basis for determining whether the service concession asset should be recorded.

Measurement of Service Concession Assets

An existing asset of the grantor is only reclassified for reporting purposes as a service concession asset. However, any upgrade to that asset is recognized as a service concession asset and measured at fair value. This means that the same asset is separated into components with potentially different accounting treatments. The existing component may be measured at historical cost, while the upgrade is initially measured at fair value. Further, upgrading an asset may change its function or nature and extend its useful life. It is suggested that, following upgrade, the whole asset be revalued and treated as a service concession asset.

Definition and measurement of a Performance Obligation

The Exposure Draft requires a liability to be initially recognised at equal value to the fair value of the asset recognised. This liability comprises any financial liability stipulated, with the remainder made up by a performance obligation.

No definition of performance obligation has been provided, although it is discussed in paragraphs 22-23. In ACAG's view, the Exposure Draft's proposal to use performance obligation as a 'balancing item' is not conceptually sound. In substance, any performance obligation to the operator should not change depending on the value of related financial liabilities. Without a definition and explicit expression as to why this is a liability, it is difficult to link with IPSAS 19 'Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets'.

In addition, it would provide more clarity as to the intention of paragraph 23 if such a definition were provided. Currently, the intention of paragraph 23 is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the asset which would be recognised as being of equal value to the performance obligation would be the tangible or intangible service concession asset (e.g. Property, Plant and Equipment) or an asset related to future payments from the operator.

The Application Guidance could be clearer as to the nature of the performance obligation. For example, paragraph AG3(b) could read 'The grantor recognises a performance obligation when, as compensation to the operator for providing the service concession asset, it grants the operator access...'

Definitions

As discussed above, ACAG believes the performance obligation should be defined. The extent to which the scope paragraphs limit the application of the Exposure Draft is also unclear. For example, does the reference to the service concession asset providing services "to the public on behalf of the grantor" in paragraph 7 narrow the scope of the Exposure Draft to exclude service concession arrangements where the services are provided directly to the government?

We believe the term service concession arrangement should be defined.

A service concession asset is defined in paragraph 3(c) as one recognised in accordance with paragraphs 10 or 11. However, paragraph 10 also includes an existing asset of the grantor which is *reclassified* as a service concession asset. Paragraph 3(c) should therefore read "...conditions for recognition or reclassification set out in...".

We consider that paragraph 14 does not fit under the heading 'Recognition and Measurement of a Service Concession Asset' and would be better suited as part of the 'Scope' section.

Terminology

Paragraphs 23 and AG43 refer to the operator's 'right to use' the service concession asset. However, both this term, and the term 'access', are used interchangeably. It is suggested that it is more accurate to describe the operator's 'access' to the service concession asset, as in paragraphs AG38 and AG42. 'Right to use' might suggest that the grantor passes control to the operator, whereas 'access' is more akin to making available for use but not giving control. Consequently, paragraph 8(b) would require amending. It reads "...operator gives the grantor access for the purpose of the service concession arrangement." 'Access' in that case should read 'control'.

Other issues

ACAG considers that paragraph 28 should be clearer as to whether or not there is a choice to disclose arrangements individually or in the aggregate.

Kevin Stevenson
The Chairman
Australian Accounting Standards Board
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24 May 2010

Dear Kevin,

AASB Exposure Draft 194 Request for Comment on IPSASB Exposure Draft *Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor*

We write in response to the request for comments contained in the April 2010 Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) Request for Comment on IPSASB Exposure Draft *Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor* (ED 194).

Guidance on the accounting for service concession arrangements (SCAs) by grantors is needed, as there are a large number of these projects in Australia and divergence in the accounting adopted by the grantors exists.

We are generally supportive of the approach taken in the exposure draft which mirrors the accounting for SCAs in IFRIC 12 for operators. However, we are still not convinced that the recognition of a liability for a performance obligation is always consistent with the *Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements* (Framework). There are also some points that need clarification. These issues are explained in the Appendix to this letter, together with our responses to the specific matters for comment.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss our views at your convenience. Please contact me on 03 8603 4320 if you would like to discuss this further.

Yours sincerely



Paul Shepherd
Partner

Specific Matters for Comment

1. there are any regulatory issues or other issues arising in the Australian environment that may affect the implementation of the proposals;

Subject to the issues raised below, we do not believe that there are any specific issues arising in the Australian environment that may affect the implementation of the proposals at present. However, we understand that some governments may have concerns about having the assets and liabilities on their balance sheets.

2. overall, the proposals would result in financial statements that would be useful to users; and

Currently there is divergence in how SCAs are accounted for by public sector entities. The proposals in ED 194 will remove this divergence and provide consistency, resulting in more useful information for users.

3. the proposals are in the best interests of the Australian and New Zealand economies.

Subject to our detailed comments below, we believe the current proposals are in the best interest of the Australian and New Zealand economies, as they remove existing divergence.

Comments on the proposals in the IPSASB Exposure Draft

Recognition of a performance obligation

We are still concerned that the recognition of a non-financial liability for performance obligations may not be consistent with the principles set out in the *Framework*. For example, where the grantor provides an operator the right to collect fees from users of the service concession asset or provides access to another revenue generating asset for its use, the grantor would have to recognise a performance obligation under the proposals.

However, in our view the obligation of the grantor is extinguished once the license has been granted. As there will also be no future outflows of economic benefits, there would appear to be no basis for the recognition of a liability under the framework, unless the grantor has any ancillary or additional obligations, eg to ensure that users utilised the asset to generate fees.

Scope of the proposed standard

There have been questions whether IFRIC 12 also applies where an operator only provides the asset and maintains it, but does not provide the public service associated with the infrastructure. It would be helpful if the scope of the proposed standard could be clarified to illustrate whether such arrangements are expected to be covered by the standard. This would ensure consistent application and interpretation of the standard.

Recognition of an intangible asset

It is noted that ED 194 is intended to mirror the accounting for operators in a SCA, and as such, according to paragraph 18, a service concession asset is recognised by the grantor in accordance with the requirements of either the property plant & equipment standard or intangibles standard. We cannot think of situations where an SCA would give rise to an intangible from the perspective of the grantor.

Recognition and measurement of assets constructed by the operator

Grantors are required to recognise a service concession asset in respect of assets constructed by the operator for which compensation is received by the operator in the form of the right to collect fees from users or the provision of another revenue generating asset, however there is little guidance under the proposals as to the initial recognition and measurement of the assets in this scenario.

In our view, further clarification is required to illustrate at what point the service concession asset is recognised, for example, is the asset recognised as the asset is constructed, when the asset is available for public use, or when another revenue generating asset is provided (where applicable)? Similarly clarification is required as to the measurement basis of the service concession asset.

Transitional requirements

Paragraph 30 notes that where a service concession asset was not previously recognised that the standard would apply prospectively. However, it is not clear whether the standard would apply only to those SCAs where the relevant agreements are entered into after the initial application date of the standard, or if this would also apply to existing SCAs.

28 May 2010

Mr Kevin Stevenson
 Chairman
 Australian Accounting Standards Board
 PO Box 204
 Collins Street West
 Melbourne VIC 8007
 AUSTRALIA

Via email: standard@asb.gov.au

Dear Mr Stevenson

Comments on Exposure Draft 194 Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft 194 Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor. CPA Australia, the Institute of Chartered Accountants (the Institute), and the National Institute of Accountants (the Joint Accounting Bodies) have considered the above exposure draft (ED) and our comments follow.

The Joint Accounting Bodies represent over 180,000 professional accountants in Australia. Our members work in diverse roles across public practice, commerce, industry, government and academia throughout Australia and internationally.

The Joint Accounting Bodies support the ED proposal. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) decision not to specify the accounting required of the grantor to a service concession arrangement has left a significant vacuum. The [proposed] Standard fills this vacuum for not-for-profit public sector grantors. We understand that on some occasions the grantor to an Australian service concession arrangement is a for-profit public sector entity (and is outside the scope of the [proposed] Standard). We encourage the AASB to research this issue and share its finding with the IASB. Our submission to the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) is attached.

The Joint Accounting Bodies note that the IPSASB ED refers to the application of IPSAS 19 *Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets* to determine the value of a performance obligation after initial recognition. The AASB 137 *Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets* definition of a liability is different from that used in IPSAS 19 – the latter includes the words “or service potential”. We believe the different definitions may result in differences in the operation of the Australian [proposed] Standard and the international equivalent. The inclusion in the [proposed] Standard of an “Aus” not-for-profit paragraph definition of liability would overcome any difference.

Representatives of the Australian Accounting Profession



cpaaustralia.com.au



The Institute of
 Chartered Accountants
 in Australia


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
nia.org.au

If you have any questions regarding this submission, please do not hesitate to contact either Mark Shying (CPA Australia) at mark.shying@cpaaustralia.com.au, Kerry Hicks (the Institute) at kerry.hicks@charteredaccountants.com.au or Tom Ravlic (NIA) at tom.ravlic@nia.org.au.

Yours sincerely



Alex Malley
**Chief Executive Officer
CPA Australia Ltd**



Graham Meyer
**Chief Executive Officer
Institute of Chartered
Accountants in Australia**

Andrew Conway
**Chief Executive Officer
National Institute of
Accountants**

28 May 2010

Ms Stephenie Fox
Technical Director
International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board
International Federation of Accountants
277 Wellington Street West
TORONTO ONTARIO CANADA M5V 3H2

Email: edcomments@ifac.org; stepheniefox@ifac.org

Dear Stephenie

Exposure Draft 43 Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) Exposure Draft ED 43 *Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor*.

CPA Australia, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (the Institute), and the National Institute of Accountants (the Joint Accounting Bodies) represent over 180,000 professional accountants in Australia. Our members work in diverse roles across public practice, commerce, industry, government and academia throughout Australia and internationally.

Australian grantors and operators have embraced service concession arrangements as an innovative way to provide infrastructure and deliver infrastructure-related services. Operators construct, manage and may control many of the major risks and benefits for 30 to 50 years associated with billions of dollars of investment in toll roads, airports, ports, railways, hospitals and water infrastructure. There may be some instances where control resides with the State.

In jurisdictions such as Australia where both private and public sector entities apply the full set of IFRS as adopted there has been a significant vacuum because of the IASB's decision to not take a holistic approach, and instead prescribe the accounting by the operator, and not specify the accounting required of the grantor, including Government Business Enterprises (GBE). The Joint Accounting Bodies understand that in Australia the grantor in the service concession arrangement is either a not-for-profit public sector entity or a GBE. We consider it appropriate that the IPSASB issue a Standard that fills the vacuum for not-for-profit public sector grantors. Accordingly, we consider it appropriate that the [proposed] Standard:

- addresses service concession arrangements from the grantor's perspective; and
- mirrors the principles set out in IFRIC 12 *Service Concession Arrangements* for accounting by the operator.

Representatives of the Australian Accounting Profession



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The Institute of
Chartered Accountants
in Australia

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
nia.org.au

We note that the accounting for service concessions where a GBE is the grantor will remain unclear, since GBEs are rightly never within the scope of IPSAS and the IASB is yet to address the accounting for grantors. We encourage the IPSASB to work together with the IASB to address this anomaly.



We observe that the [proposed] Standard refers to assets used in a service concession arrangement as "service concession assets", whereas IFRIC 12 refers to such assets as infrastructure. We understand that the reason for the changed words is to avoid confusion with terminology already used in the public sector. Our acceptance of the revised terminology is premised on the condition that the types of service concession arrangements within the scope of the [proposed] Standard mirror those within IFRIC 12.

If you require further information on any of our views, please contact Mark Shying, CPA Australia via email at mark.shying@cpaaustralia.com.au, Kerry Hicks, the Institute via email at kerry.hicks@charteredaccountants.com.au or Tom Ravlic, the National Institute of Accountants via email at tom.ravlic@nia.org.au.

Yours sincerely



Alex Malley
Chief Executive Officer
CPA Australia Ltd



Graham Meyer
Chief Executive Officer
Institute of Chartered
Accountants in Australia

Andrew Conway
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